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ROBERT J. McMANUS, ESQ.*

Why the Ohio Case Shouldn't
Matter
ABSTRACT
The significanceof the court's decision in Ohio v. InteriorDept.
is easy to overstate, since the court held only that the InteriorDepartment had not acted capriciously in including contingent valuation methodology (CVM) among several alternativesavailable
for the conduct of naturalresourcesdamageassessments (NRDAs).
In practice,many proceduraland institutionalsafeguardswill protect us from erroneous NRDAs. In any event, the entire NRDA
process is overly complicated, virtually impossible to administer
and of uncertain utility. Consideration should be given to abandoning it altogether,or at least to replacing it with a surchargeon
response and remediation costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Considering some of the things we lawyers have been called
recently, it is refreshing to participate in this economists' exercise, since
the worst I will legitimately be called as a result is a "dog in the manger."
Not only is this relatively benign in itself, but it is also a role for which
I have volunteered in this context, on two scores.
In the first place, I believe that the "lightning rod" paper by
Messrs. Cummings and Harrison proceeds on the basis of two unstated
but faulty assumptions: (1) that the decision of the Court of Appeals
in State of Ohio v. U.S. Departmentof the Interior was significant in terms
of the impact of the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) on future litigation; and (2) that the assessment of natural resource damages is, or
will become, a significant aspect of our developing jurisprudence under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, or "Superfund"). 2 Part II of this comment attempts
to demonstrate that both of these assumptions are unwarranted and
that a rigorous critique of CVM is therefore quixotic.
As if that were not surficiently mean-spirited and belittling of
the efforts of the co-contributing economists, I have also volunteered
for the present assignment to repeat publicly, with renewed conviction,
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1. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
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what I have stated before 3: that the natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) provisions of Superfund-like those of the closely-related Oil Pollution Act of 19904 -are so exquisitely complex that their
implementation is simply not worth the bother. This point is expanded
on briefly in Part III. For those so annoyed by its brazenness that they
are unable to steel themselves to read Part III, its thrust may be captured by the following unembellished factual statement of our current
status:
Half a score and four years have passed since Superfund was
enacted. After elaborate study and protracted public debate,
the Department of the Interior (DOI) promulgated federal
regulations, as (but later than) required, to govern the assessment of damages for injuries inflicted on certain natural
resources by spills of "hazardous substances", as well as by
oil spills covered by Section 311 of the Clean Water Act.5
These regulations were overturned in major respects by a
federal court of appeals. In response, DOI returned to Square
One, by publishing in the Federal Register an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) 6 to see if members of
the public might shed some light on a proper response to
the court's mandate. Soon thereafter, Congress stripped DOI
of its authority in respect of NRDA regulations applicable
to oil spills, vesting it in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce.7 Over five years have passed, and NOAA has not
reached any final decisions on issues addressed almost three
years previously by the Ohio court, and by DOI before that.
After publishing no less than eight preliminary notices in
the Federal Register and receiving the advice of a special advisory panel convened to evaluate CVM, NOAA has at last
published proposed regulations, 8 the period for public comment currently extended through July 7, 1994. We are now
engaged in an academic debate, with at least eight initial
participants, as to whether one candidate methodology for
NRDA--CVM-is accurate enough to be used in litigation.
3. R. McManus, NaturalResources Damages Under Section 311, Oil Spills: Management
and Legislative Implications (M. Spaulding & M. Reed, eds., 1990); R. McManus, Natural
Resource Damages Under Superfund, 22 Nat. Res. L. Newsletter (ABA) 19 (Fall, 1990).
4. Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (Aug. 18, 1990) 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761.

5. 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
6. 54 Fed. Reg. 39,016 (Sept. 22, 1989).

7. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Sec. 1006(e)(1), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2706(e) (1) (1991).
8. 59 Fed. Reg. 1062 (Jan. 7, 1994).
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In a better world, the participants in this debate would be otherwise occupied, for essentially the same reason that all golf courses
should be plowed up and planted to sorghum.
II. OVERSTATEMENT COMPOUNDED
The first of the unpleasant points made in this paper is that the
present exercise proceeds on an erroneous perception-perhaps a reflection of somebody's worst fears-of the importance of the Ohio court's
treatment of CVM. In fact, the court's holding and discussion on this
score were completely predictable, surprising to no one and subject to
so many qualifications in practice that it is almost impossible to avoid
overstating the case's significance.
A. What the Ohio Court Did
At the outset, it is worth restating exactly what the Ohio court
actually did and said in respect of CVM, as dealt with in DOI's NRDA
regulations.
The regulations reviewed in the Ohio litigation included provisions designed to assist the designated public "trustees" in calculating the damages due for injury to natural resources. The regulations
provided that the actual costs of restoration were one measure of such
damages. 9 Another measure was "use value," defined as
the value to the public of recreational or other public uses of
the resource, as measured by changes in consumer surplus,
any fees or other payments collectable by the [trustee] for a
private party's use of the natural resource, and any economic
rent accruing to a private party because the [trustee] does
10
not charge a fee or price for the use of the resource.
Lost use value was to be determined by the diminution in market price where the injured resource is in fact traded in a market, or by
an appraisal technique in cases where a comparable resource is traded.
In other cases, the regulations sanctioned the use of nonmarket methodologies, including CVM. 11 The statutory basis for the designation of
any NRDA methodology, including CVM, is found in section 301 of Superfund, which requires in pertinent part that the NRDA regulations
identify "the best available procedures" for quantifying damages for
12
injury to natural resources."
9. 43 C.F.R. § 11.81.
10. Id. at § 11. 83 (b) (1).
11. Id. § 11.83(d). The proposed NDAA regulations would do likewise. See, 59 Fed.
Reg. 1062, 1182 (Jan 7, 1994).

12. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2).
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Some (but a minority) of the industry challengers of the DOI
regulations included claims that DOI had acted unlawfully in including CVM among the procedures that a Superfund trustee might use
where market-based methodologies were inapposite. In plain English,
the petitioners' claim was simply that CVM is too imprecise, leading
to speculation and generally to inflated price tags on damaged resources. In legal terms, the petitioners claimed that DOI had behaved
contrary to the statute in determining, after notice-and-comment rulemaking, that CVM constituted a "best available procedure" within the
meaning of Section 301. As a separate facet of their argument, the petitioners claimed that it was also "arbitrary and capricious" for DOI to
invest a NRDA based on CVM with the "rebuttable presumption" of
correctness accorded DOI's designated assessment procedures by section 107 of Superfund.' 3 In fact, the petitioners continued, it violated
their rights to due process of law under the United States Constitution
to accord CVM the evidentiary weight of presumptive correctness.
The Ohio court rejected all these arguments (which a nonlawyer
might be forgiven for considering restatements of the same objection).
In what is arguably the key passage of the opinion on this score, the
court stated, "It cannot be gainsaid that DOI's decision to adopt [CVM]
was made intelligently and cautiously," since DOI had, after all, examined 23 studies of CVM and had actually modified the procedure
described in its proposed rule in at least one respect favorable to the
petitioners.' 4 Accordingly, the court found DOI's behavior "reasonable
and consistent with congressional intent, and therefore worthy of deference."1 5 On essentially the same basis, the court stated separately its
determination that DOI had not acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
according CVM the statutory "rebuttable presumption" of correctness
to which it was entitled by virtue of its inclusion among the "best available procedures." 1 6
B. The Elements of Overstatement
As stated previously, the Ohio court' s holding and opinion regarding CVM are simply not very important to the future course of litigation under Section 107(f) of Superfund. At least six discrete
considerations lead to this assessment.
In the first place, it is easy to forget what the Ohio court did
not (and could not) do at the time of its decision in 1989: it did not uphold a judgment awarding damages based on a NRDA which was
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C).
14. 880 F.2d at 476, n. 83 at 477.
15. Id. at 477.
16. Id. at 479.
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based in turn on CVM. If academic economists believe that CVM is in
fact too speculative or is biased towards inflated statements of damages, they should reserve their loudest complaints for the day when a
governmental trustee actually obtains such a judgment and collects it
from the party or parties responsible for a spill. The Ohio case did not
even come close. Notwithstanding the court's holding on this relatively
minor aspect of the case before it, a reasonable possibility remains that
justice can still be done when actual cases arise.
And, it should be noted in passing, the court's assessment of
CVM was indeed a "relatively minor" aspect of the case. Among eleven
separate challenges, it was the last point that the court considered. It
was raised by only three of the industry litigants; and, although the reported opinion does not establish the fact, it is a fair inference that counsel considered the challenge a long shot, relegated to the tail end of
their briefs. Admittedly, courts can do great damage in responding to
tenuous arguments or secondary challenges. But this was not done in
Ohio, and an assessment of the impact of the case's discussion of CVM
would probably benefit by being viewed in its proper perspective, as
a minor thread of a sprawling administrative law case.
But that, of course, is merely a matter of tone. For present purposes, it is far more important that commentators recall the standard
of review that the Ohio court was required to use in ruling on challenges to DOI's work-product. Like most federal regulations not subject to specially-tailored procedures, the NRDA regulations were subject
only to the general requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) 17 and to its "informal rulemaking" procedures in particular.
These generally require notice to the public of proposed rules, followed
by a reasonable opportunity for written comment. As currently construed and implemented, they also require some sensate response to
comments received, and publication of such responses in the preamble to agencies' final rulemaking actions. Those actions are subject to
to uphold
judicial review; in such cases, a reviewing court is required
18
an agency decision unless it is "arbitrary and capricious."
While such a standard permits a good deal of subjectivity in
reviewing the fruits of bureaucracy, it is properly regarded as highly
deferential to the administrative agencies. To put it another way, a reviewing court is required to uphold an agency rule against a challenge
under the APA even if the court would have reached a different result,
unless-in the formulation repeated by the Ohio court-the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of a
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706.

18. 5 U.S.C § 706(2)(A).
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problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed19 to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise.
If the deferential nature of this standard is borne in mind, the
Ohio court's decision "upholding" CVM begins to look less like a ringing endorsement, and more like a perfunctory written assurance that
DOI had actually thought seriously about the matter before admitting
CVM to the list of "best available procedures."
And, on the record revealed by the published opinion, it was
clear that DOI had done so: it examined 23 studies of CVM, and it compiled an annotated bibliography of 323 articles and studies, ". . . including many treatises addressing CV methodology... ;" it even
20
modified the final rule on CVM in response to critical comments.
Granted that hindsight is always 20/20, this record had all the earmarks of an agency rulemaking decision that would withstand judicial review under the relatively permissive standard of the APA. It would
therefore be a mistake to view the court's holding as a judicial endorsement of CVM following full and fair academic debate.
Just as it is easy to overstate the extent to which the Ohio court
actually approved CVM, it is easy to exaggerate the practical effect of
the decision. In a case actually brought to trial, the trial court would
have great leeway in excluding, discounting or ignoring CVM evidence
adduced by a trustee in support of a specific dollar claim. A trial court
that excludes a given piece of evidence will not be reversed on that
ground unless its decision was "clearly erroneous." Therefore, since
the critique of Messrs. Cummings and Harrison suggests-at least to
this lawyer-that CVM studies of particular spills will reveal ample
bases of attack, the DOI regulations will seldom compel the admission
of specific studies, and trial courts will often be able to exclude CVM
evidence.
Beyond questions of admissibility, of course, lie questions of
the weight to be accorded particular pieces of evidence. Even if a CVM
study is admitted as probative of damages in a particular case, Superfund certainly does not require that its results be conclusive-as already noted, even a study based on a "best available procedure" is
subject to rebuttal. Critiques of CVM like the Cummings and Harrison
submission suggest, in addition, that a trial judge will have almost boundless freedom to accord little weight to CVM studies offered as proof of
specific dollar amounts in particular cases. Admittedly, the statutory
19. 880 F.2d at 479, quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
20. See supra note 14.
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provision which accords NRDAs based on "best available procedures"
the benefit of a rebuttable presumption does not specify what sort of
evidence, or how much of it, is required to overcome the presumption,
and predicting the future course of litigation is always risky business.
But, in the absence of statutory guidance, decisions on what is needed
to overcome the presumption will proceed on a case by-case basis.
There is no reason to believe that expert testimony on the inadequacy
of CVM, generally or as applied to a particular spill, would not be both
(1) admissible and (2) sufficient to overcome the presumption created
by the DOI regulation upheld in Ohio.
In sum, our litigation process has safety valves that should relieve pressure to render judgments on the basis of flawed or inapposite economic methodology. In addition to those procedural safety
valves, a number of other practical factors would tend to mitigate any
distortions in results that might be attributable to CVM. First and most
obviously, most lawsuits do not go to trial. The vast majority of them
are settled. There is no reason to believe that this will not be so in respect of NRDAs. And, to the extent a quick survey of cases under both
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act and Section 107(f) of Superfund has
predictive value, it will be so: only one reported federal case has yet
ruled on the adequacy of a given NRDA.2 1
Admittedly, the kind of methodology inferably dissected by DOI
in developing the NRDA regulations and criticized in the present volume would be important if it were expected to yield answers, in dollars, that real defendants must actually pay. But the strong incentives
that our judicial system gives to extrajudicial settlement virtually guarantee that few, if any, NRDAs will bear such a burden in practice. When
push comes to shove, the marginal effect on a settlement attributable
to the flawed application of CVM will be lost in the static. Availability
of resources, timeliness of payment and the enormous transaction costs
of actually litigating the dollar value of damaged public natural resources will each have far greater influence on settlements than the
opinions of consulting economists, based in turn on the public surveys
central to CVM.
Even if the only type of damage claim arising from a spill were
the trustees' claims for natural resource injuries, it would be a safe bet
that most of them would not go to trial. But in fact, this type of claim
is only one in a constellation of legal remedies available in the aftermath of a serious spill. Under Section 107 of Superfund, the party or
parties responsible for the release of a hazardous substance will be liable to just about everybody, public or private, for costs incurred in
21. Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transport, 1991 Westlaw 22479 (D.Idaho 1991)(use
of CVM evidence disallowed).
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cleaning up the spill in accordance with the National Contingency
Plan.22 They will be subject to an order under Section 106 to engage in23
long-term remediation, and to civil penalties for failure to comply;
or, if the government disburses funds under Superfund, the spillers
will be liable for reimbursement. Beyond Superfund, they will be liable to private entities for damages other than clean-up costs-such as
lost business revenues. The more litigants and the more causes of action in the wake of a spill, the less weight any particular element of
damages will have in the settlement negotiations.
Consider, for example, the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez awkwardness: after some two and a half years of negotiations, the parties
announced a settlement whereby Exxon would pay out $1.125 billion
dollars (having already laid out, Exxon claimed, $2.5 billion). Of the
settlement amount, $100 million was described as "restitution for environmental damage," to be shared equally by the federal and Alaska
governments. 24 One suspects that the size of these $50 million chunks
depended not at all on careful damage assessments, let alone consideration of the appropriateness of CVM in arriving at a theoretically defensible quantification. Predictably, it will be a highly unusual case in
which CVM has any discernible effect on the amount of money that
changes hands.
If, then, deficiencies in CVM will be correctable in the process
of litigation, and if uncorrected deficiencies will predictably have almost no impact on real-world results, it remains to be seen whether
any other factors would tend to minimize even further the significance
of the present academic debate among economists. Two factors would.
First, NRDAs will probably not be invoked very often, and those
potentially dependent on CVM will be invoked even less often. The
basic premise of the statutory provisions authorizing trustees' recoveries for natural resource damages is that a public resource has been
harmed, and that, as a result, the public has suffered some detriment
in addition to the costs of short-term clean-up or longer-term remediation. Most real estate contiguous to the industrial activities of production and transportation of designated "hazardous substances" are
privately owned, and therefore probably not covered by Superfund's
definition of-one of "natural resources".25 The obvious major exception particular relevance to oil spills-relates to spills into waterways.
Not only are most waterways public property, but their physical na22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605, 9607(a)(4)(A), (B).

23. Id. § 9606.
24. 22 Env. Rptr. 1403 (Current Developments, Oct. 4, 1991).
25. Section 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). It is unnecessary, however, that legal title
to the damaged resources be held by government. Some privately-owned resources may
"appertain to public entities for these purposes, although the only example offered on
this score by the Ohio court was private tidelands subject to a right of public access. 880
F.2d at 432.
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ture will tend to spread the effects of a spill far beyond the area originally impacted, as in the case of the Exxon Valdez spill. In most spill
situations, however, public resources will not be damaged in a manner
leading to destruction or substantial loss of use during their restoration. Accordingly, trustees' actions implicating NRDAs and CVM will
predictably be rare.
Even when such claims are made, moreover, the DOI rules upheld in Ohio will not always come into play. It must be recalled that
Section 301 of Superfund requires two sets of NRDA procedures: those
"simplified assessments" governing relatively small spills ("Type A assessments") and those based on the individualized consideration and
extensive field research appropriate to major spills ("Type B assessments"). 26 DOI had separately promulgated procedures for Type A assessments, consisting essentially of a computer model known as the
Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine
Environments (NRDAM/CME"), 27 procedures which were upheld in
Ohio's companion case .28 The CVM methodology that was at issue in
Ohio and that provides the subject matter of the present exercise will
not come into play in spill situations in which federal trustees resort
to Type A assessments. Thus, the universe of cases in which the perceived deficiencies of CVM are of any consequence continues to dwindle.
Finally, the significance of those deficiencies will be further
minimized in practice by one more factor that goes beyond the conduct of trials, the economic impact of NRDAs or the frequency of NRDAs
based even partially on CVM. It is this: Whatever distortions might be
attributable to CVM as applied to particular cases, those distortions
will have no effect on the behavior of other potentially responsible parties.
Such effects, after all, are what makes litigation important to
society at large, and what makes legal doctrine of broader social importance. Legal doctrine which takes economics into account erroneously or inadequately is bad legal doctrine-not merely because it
fails to deliver justice to the litigants in those cases that are actually
brought, but because it distorts the decisionmaking of the far greater
number of those who are only potential litigants. Thus, most businesses
have not in fact been antitrust defendants, but their behavior towards
their competitors is governed in large measure by antitrust doctrines
based in turn on the economic perceptions of legislators, lawyers and
courts. Similarly, many private decisions relating to production and investment will be strongly influenced by the nature and extent of lia26. 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c)(2)(A), (B).
27. 52 Fed. Reg. 9045 (Mar. 20, 1987).

28. State of Colorado v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior,880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir 1989).
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bility that may attach to a given commercial activity. The production
of vaccines comes to mind. If damages assessed for defective batches
of vaccine embody poor theoretical economics, then resources will be
misallocated when future decisions on investment or production are
skewed as a result.
In this most fundamental sense, the deficiencies of CVM are
essentially irrelevant. For reasons suggested by much of the foregoing,
it is close to inconceivable that any handler of oil or hazardous substances would alter his or her behavior in response to the erroneous
application of CVM to NRDAs. In this, NRDA procedures stand in stark
contrast to the examples of antitrust doctrine or product liability, where
faulty economics could clearly influence behavior to the detriment of
society's interest in optimum resource allocation.
Imagine, as seems likely, that CVM generally results in inflated
valuations. The extent of that inflation, it is submitted, could not plausibly be thought to influence the behavior of potential spillers, for the
simple reason that they would have far too many other matters on their
minds. Such matters would include potentially colossal clean-up costs,
the costs of elaborate studies and EPA's oversight and implementation
of longer-term remediation, private damage claims, civil and criminal
penalties (including, in the case of Section 311 of the Clean Water Act,
jail time for a negligent discharge), 29 internal costs and bad publicity.
In other words, trustees' claims for injuries to natural resources can be
expected to have virtually no deterrent effect. Consequently, the notion that any such deterrent effect might be distorted by theoretically
flawed damage assessment procedures becomes absurd.
III. A POLITICALLY UNREALISTIC PROPOSAL
The foregoing negativism seems to lead gracefully to an even
more negative line of thought: If CVM will not produce "accurate"
NRDAs, and if NRDAs will not influence behavior, what purpose is
served by the twin statutory authorities, in the Oil Pollution Act and
in Superfund, that compel their use? (This, of course, is a rhetorical
question.)
Before providing the answer, I should first state my own belief
that CVM will not in fact produce "accurate" NRDAs. My reading, admittedly inexpert, of the Cummings and Harrison paper indicates that
CVM is not reliable: it is subject to wild swings in numerical result,
depending on how questions are phrased; and, its results apparently
diverge from those derived from other accepted methodologies. Beyond that, I admit to a good deal of impatience with the intricacy of
the economists' debate aired in this volume, not only because of the
29. Clean Water Act, Sec. 309(c), 33 U.S.C. §§ 319(c).
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opinions expressed above in Part II of this comment, but also because
I believe that statistical concepts like "validity", "reliability" and "consistency" are essentially meaningless when applied to a methodology
for answering a question to which there is no correct answer. When
markets are non-existent and substitute measurements unavailable,
dollar values become meaningless, unanchored to the social mechanisms and institutions that make them possible in the first place. In
such circumstances, attempts to create a dollar value by recourse to
CVM--or any other "best available procedure" seem truly to be attempts
to "eff the ineffable."
What if an oil spill creates an "asphalt shoreline" that endures
for a decade in a remote wilderness area; if the grounding of a chemical tanker kills a pod of blue whales; or, if a cloud of toxic gas decimates (but does not annihilate) a rookery watched by many birders?
In each of these cases, an actionable release has damaged public resources, but the present exercise demonstrates that monetization of
those damages cannot be accomplished meaningfully. And, even if it
could, it apparently cannot be accomplished simply or inexpensively.
I therefore propose that Congress consider the two following
options.
(1)Excise the NRDA provisions of CERCLA and OPA, essentially in their entirety. If this option were implemented, future spillers
of "hazardous substances" and oil would scarcely get a free ride: they
would remain liable for potentially ruinous judgments to reimburse
public and private entities for the costs of clean-up, remediation and
lost revenues, as well as for civil and criminal penalties. If deterrence
is desired, this menu of liabilities should clearly suffice. Admittedly,
simple excision of the troublesome statutory provisions would leave
some injuries uncompensated. Where the clean-ups and remediation
have failed to restore public resources to their status quo ante, some instances of environmental impairment would not lead directly to the
transfer of more money to government. Should we decide that such a
result is unacceptable, we have an alternative:
(2) Impose a natural resources surcharge on recoveries under
Superfund or OPA. As matters now stand, recoveries under the NRDA
provisions must be devoted to the restoration or replacement of injured
natural resources or to acquisition of their "equivalent." 30 These provisions therefore represent a collective decision that irreparable harm
to public natural resources should lead to investments, funded by
spillers, in more such resources. If that decision is to remain undisturbed,3 1 there seems to be no reason why it could not be implemented
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(0(1); 33 U.S.C. §§ 2706(f).
31. Given the many ills that beset society, it is unclear to this commentator that it
should remain undisturbed.

120
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by the addition of a supplementary percentage to the bill for cleanup-in the nature of a "service charge," if you will, the proceeds of
which would be ear-marked for investment in natural amenities, such
as wildlife preservation or park improvements. If (as seems utterly unlikely) NRDAs actually carry some marginal deterrent effect, that effect would surely attach to a surcharge, too. If (as seems inevitable)
some might complain that a surcharge would bear no relation to the
value of the injury sustained, the retorts are obvious:
(i)
How do you know?
(ii)
What's new?

